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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-A Dependency Hearing Which
Would Deny an Unwed Father Custody of His Child on the
Death of Its Mother Without Reference to the Father's
Fitness as a Parent Is Violative of Due Process and Equal
Protection.
Peter and Joan Stanley lived together for over eighteen years during which time they had and raised three illegitimate children. On
Joan's death, the Circuit Court of Cook County declared Stanley's children wards of the court. The eldest was adjudged neglected' while the
two younger children were adjudged dependent2 in proceedings authorized under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act.3 A married couple was
subsequently awarded custody of the younger children.
The crucial difference between a neglect hearing and a dependency
hearing under the Juvenile Court Act is that in the former, a showing
of parental unfitness is necessary to deny parental custody,4 while in
the latter, a child may be adjudged dependent merely on showing that
it had no parent, guardian or legal custodian.5 Therein lay the basis
for Peter Stanley's case. Under the Juvenile Court Act, "parent" includes only natural or adoptive parents of a legitimate child or the
natural mother of an illegitimate child.6 This definition excludes the
natural father of an illegitimate child. Thus, Illinois, upon learning
that the Stanleys were never married, was able to institute the less
rigorous dependency proceeding in order to declare the younger Stanley children wards of the court.
Stanley appealed the result of the dependency hearing to the Illinois Supreme Court, arguing that exclusion of unwed fathers from the
statutory definition of "parent" was violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution. The court affirmed the decision holding
that the distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers was ra7
tionally related to the purposes and policy of the Juvenile Court Act.
1. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 667 n.5 (1972). Evidently, the court thought
that Peter and Joan Stanley were married. Had they never been married, the older
daughter would have been subject to a dependency proceeding, just as were the other
children.
2. Id. at 646.
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-1 et seq. (1971).
4. ILL. REV. SrAT. ch. 37, § 702-4 (1971).
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-5 (1971).
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14 (1971).
7. In re Stanley, 45 ll.2d 132, 134, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (1970).
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A petition for a writ of certiorari was brought to the United States
Supreme Court and granted. 8 The Court reversed and remanded in a
five to two decision.' The three part opinion of the Court, written
by Mr. Justice White, stated the holding twice, first as a prelude to its
analysis and then by way of conclusion. The difference in the phrasing
of these two statements is significant. The initial statement of the holding asserts that:
[A] s a matter of due process of law Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from
him and that by denying him a hearing and extending it to all
other parents whose custody of their children is challenged the State
denied Stanley the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 0
The key features of this passage are first, the Court's strong reliance on
the Due Process Clause in order to reach its result, and second, the use
of language which appears to limit the Court's holding to Stanley or those
who are similarly situated. While Stanley, himself, was emphasized
in the initial statement, the latter statement of the holding spoke in
terms of Illinois parents generally.
We have concluded that all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody. It follows that denying such a hearing
to Stanley and those like him while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause."
It seems that under this formulation, "all Illinois parents" is the sum of
"Stanley" and "other Illinois parents". Thus, the court in its latter
statement would hold Stanley to be an Illinois parent, contrary to the
definition of "parent" in the Juvenile Court Act. On the other hand,
the initial holding could be read in a more limited fashion. In order
to reach its initial result, the Court merely had to hold that Stanley,
an unwed father seeking custody of his children on their mother's
death, is entitled to a hearing as to his fitness in the role of a parent,
before Illinois can declare his children wards of the court. This formulation avoids a direct statement that Stanley must be a parent within
Illinois' statutory definition.
The distinction between the two approaches is seemingly innocuous.
However, it sets the stage for some thought-provoking analysis. First,
the basis of the holding must be clarified. As noted, the opinion of
8.
9.
10.
11.

Sub nom. Stanley v. Illinois, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971).
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Id. at 649 (emphasis added).
Id. at 658 (emphasis added, Court's footnote omitted).
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the Court is in three parts. The first part serves as an introduction. The
second part focuses on the proposition that due process requires that
Stanley be given a hearing as to his fitness for custody of the children
in question. The final part concludes that the denial to unwed fathers
of such a hearing, required by due process in all cases, is violative of
equal protection; the hearing as to fitness must be available to all parents, not merely statutorily defined parents.
Mr. Justice Douglas joined only in the first two parts of the opinion.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Mr. Justice Blackmun in dissent,
vigorously criticized the Court's discussion of the due process issue12
since it was not raised in the courts below. The dissent submitted that
to decide, basically on the due process issue, was to go beyond the
3
jurisdictional limits of the Court.1
In its treatment of the equal protection issue, the dissent had no difficulty in approving the Illinois classification of parents. It agreed
with the Illinois Supreme Court that there was a valid state interest
served by the classification.1" Special emphasis was placed on the argument that Illinois was justified in classifying unwed fathers differently from other parents because unwed fathers had no legal responsibility for the child under the statutory scheme. On the other hand, it
was argued that responsibility could more clearly be attached to unwed
mothers since they were more "readily identifiable".' 5 Other less persuasive lines were taken by the dissent in this area. Some attention
will be called to these, as appropriate, within this comment.
Although there has been a significant impact on Illinois family law
as a result of the Court's holding in Stanley, the relief granted is of
secondary importance. The primary focus should be placed on the mode
of analysis the Court used in reaching its decision. The juxtaposition
of the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause as grounds
for the decision is intriguing yet troublesome. While concepts of equal
protection and due process are not mutually exclusive, 6 it is clear that
the two concepts have not been treated as interchangeable by the Court.
The remainder of this comment will discuss the Court's conceptual dilemma in Stanley and its consequences.
12. Id. at 659.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 665 following the line of the Illinois court.
15. Id.
16. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), held that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), is applicable to the District of Columbia under the Due
Process Clause of the fifth amendment.
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THE CONCEPTUAL DILEMMA

In order to clarify the Court's unusual treatment of due process and
equal protection in Stanley, it is necessary to provide, at this point, a
cursory review of basic approaches taken in these areas. An example of
a case possessing both equal protection and due process elements is
Skinner v. Oklahoma1 7 wherein the Court unanimously rejected a statute providing for the sterilization of "habitual criminals." While the
opinion of the Court focused on the statute's failure under the Equal
Protection Clause,' concurring opinions would have reached the same
result, wholly or partially relying on the Due Process Clause. As Mr.
Justice Stone, concurring, phrased it:
A law which condemns, without hearing, [to determine whether the
convict's criminal traits are inheritable] all the individuals of a class
to so harsh a measure . . is lacking in the first principles of due
process. 19
What are these principles? There have been two schools of thought relating to due process under the fourteenth amendment. The earlier
line of cases took the position that due process of law encompasses a
guarantee for rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."20
A second, more modem, line of cases has held that the Due Process
Clause of the fourteenth amendment partially incorporates the Bill of
Rights and makes them applicable to the states."' The Court has tended
to absorb single elements of the Bill of Rights on a case by case basis.
Several concurring and dissenting opinions, however, would fully incorporate the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 2 The Supreme Court, in Morrissey v. Brewer,28
recently took the opportunity to enunciate its present position on procedural due process:
Whether any procedural protections are due depends on the extent
to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss."
. . . The question is not merely the "weight" of the individual's
interest, but whether the nature of the interest is one within the
contemplation of the "liberty or property" language of the Four17.

316 U.S. 535 (1942).

18.
19.

Id. at 538.
Id. at 545.

20.

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); see Rochin v. California, 342

U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
21. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (fourth amendment);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment); Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) (first amendment).
22. E.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 515 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

23. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 4: 176

teenth Amendment. . . . Once it is determined2 4that due process
applies, the question remains what process is due.
While due process does not encompass notions of inflexible procedures
to be followed in every instance, 25 remote administrative benefit to
a state is not in itself sufficient justification to abridge procedural due
process rights. 26 Failure to comply with safeguards of procedural due
process has invalidated a motor vehicle financial responsibility statute, 27 an Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, 28 a wage garnishment statute, 29 and even administrative regulations permitting schools to expel or suspend students in ex parte proceedings.8 0
Stanley v. Illinois presented a procedural due process problem. The
Illinois statutory scheme entitled all parents (in the statutory rather
than generic sense) to a hearing as to their fitness for the parental role
prior to denial of custody. However, exclusion from the statutory definition of "parent" withheld the procedural benefits available to statutorily recognized parents from Stanley and other unwed fathers. The
unwed father, such as Stanley, who sought the parental role, was subject to a dependency hearing. All Illinois had to show, to deny custody, was that the illegitimate child's mother had died. Fitness was
immaterial. On the other hand, parents, guardians or legal custodians were entitled to custody unless the state showed them to be unfit
in a neglect hearing. Following the reasoning the Court uses in the
second part of its opinion in Stanley, the result in the case could have
been reached solely on traditional due process grounds. Mr. Justice
Douglas' failure to join in the concluding portion of the opinion
seemingly indicates that he would have preferred to reach the result on
due process grounds. Once the Court determined that a "grievous
loss" had been suffered, it could have merely determined what process
was due by making a "determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been
24. Id. at 481.
25. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
26. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
27. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541 (1971) (lack of liability insurance insufficient
to suspend one's driver's license where fault is at issue under statutory scheme).
28. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) (evidentiary hearing required
prior to termination of welfare benefits).
29. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
30. Williams v. Dade County School Board, 441 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1971)
(thirty day suspension of high school student); Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
Education, 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (expulsion of college student from tax supported school).
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affected by the governmental action."'" Just as the Court imposed
a totally new procedure for parole revocation hearings in Morrissey v.
Brewer, the Court in Stanley could have merely instituted a special procedure for unwed fathers seeking rights in illegitimate children after
the mother's death. The Court in Stanley, however, was faced with a dilemma. The due process issue was not raised and, therefore, not decided by the courts below. 2 The alternative was to decide solely on
equal protection grounds. This, the Court was reluctant to do, for reasons that will soon become apparent. Rather than exceed its jurisdictional bounds 33 by making a determination on the due process issue
alone, the Court grafted its due process line of reasoning onto the petitioner's equal protection theory.
Had Stanley v. Illinois been decided strictly on equal protection
grounds, an entirely different set of questions would have been raised.
The Court would have had to determine whether Illinois' failure to
classify Stanley and other unwed fathers as "parents" within the Juvenile Court Act was permissible under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution.
The Court has customarily focused its attention of the classification
questioned in equal protection cases. Historically, the test applied to
the classification has depended upon whether the classification was
characterized as forbidden, 4 suspect,"5 or reasonable. 36
More modern cases have taken the view that fundamental or sensitive
individual rights must also be weighed and balanced in the determination of whether the classification is permissible within the traditional
37
equal protection formula:
The essential inquiry.. .... . a dual one: What legitimate state
interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal
rights might the classification endanger?3 8
This new formula, enunciated in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 9 is in harmony with its forerunners. All focus on the classifica31. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
32. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 659 (1972) (dissent).
33. Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 438 (1969); see 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3).
For the Court's response to this line of dissent, see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658
n.10 (stating that the decision in Stanley was made on grounds available to the courts
below).
34. E.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
35. E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
36. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
37. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); cf. Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
38. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173.
39. 406 U.S. 164.
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tion questioned. The older approach immediately made a determination as to whether or not the classification in itself was reasonable. The
classification is reasonable when there is a rational relation between
the classification and a permissible state objective.4" If the classification is suspect, the Court may subject it to close scrutiny and invalidate
it unless it serves a compelling state interest.4
While it has been
posited that classifications such as race, religion, and wealth are forbidden,42 the Court is reluctant to speak in absolutes. Mr. Justice
Jackson's concurring opinion in Edwards v. California,4 3 characterizing indigence as a classification as "constitutionally an irrelevance,"" is
as far as the Court has ventured in treating a classification as forbidden.
The formula in Weber adds a new dimension to the test of classifications under the Equal Protection Clause. Whether a classification
will be deemed impermissible now is related to the fundamental or sensitive nature of the right it endangers as well as to its inherent nature.
In Stanley, Illinois asserted that its statutory scheme could be justified since there was a legitimate state interest in imposing legal responsibility on at least one of any pair of unwed parents. The State
met its objective by imposing legal responsibility initially on the unwed
mother alone since she was readily identifiable.4 5 Nowhere in the majority opinion did the Court refute the assertion that Illinois had a rational basis for making its classification. In order to hold for Stanley
solely on equal protection grounds, focusing solely on the classification,
the Court would have to find Illinois' definition of "parent" to be invalid in that it discriminated against parents based on either their sex
or marital status. 46 Implicitly, the Court would have to hold these classifications suspect and find that there was no compelling state interest
40. See, Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
41. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
42. Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.

341, 353 (1949).
43.

314 U.S. 160, 181 (1941).

44. Id. at 185. The spirit of Edwards isespecially germane in light of Mr. Chief
Justice Burger's dissent in Stanley. The Chief Justice makes the inference that Stanley's
motives for seeking parental rights were suspect since he stood to gain additional
welfare payments. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 667. This animus on the part of
the Chief Justice is particularly incongruous since the JuVENILE COURT ACT specifically
precludes the use of financial status as a criterion of parental fitness in a neglect proceeding. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-4(2)(1971).
45. THE ILLINOIS PATERNITY AcT, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106s/, §51 et seq. (1971),
however, provides a mechanism for the identification of those fathers who are unwilling
to voluntarily acknowledge paternity.
46. Under the JUVENILE COURT ACT, unwed mothers are entitled to a hearing on
fitness while unwed fathers are not. Similarly, married or adoptive fathers are entitled
to a hearing on fitness while unwed fathers are not.
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in upholding the classification in these instances. It appears that the
Court was unwilling to take either of these steps.
Rather than hold sex a suspect classification in Reed v. Reed, 4 7 the
Court was most careful to limit its holding to the facts of the case. An
issue was tendered as to the constitutionality of a classification on the
basis of sex under the Idaho probate laws. The Court would only go
so far as to say that men and women similarly situated must have equal
rights in seeking letters of administration from the Idaho Probate
Court. The Court even refused to comment on the Idaho descent and
distribution scheme which gives males preference over females similarly situated.
Holding marital status, in itself, a suspect classification would be opposed to long-standing precedent since regulation of marriage and its
concomitant privileges, duties and obligations has long been held to be
within the province of the states.4 8 To hold that the provisions of the
Juvenile Court Act are invalid strictly on the basis of a "suspect" marital
classification might have a profound effect on the underpinnings of
every state's right to regulate marriage and the family.
Under the Weber formula, the right of an unwed father to custody
of his children on the death of their mother could have been held "fundamental or sensitive". Then, the classification could more readily have
been viewed as impermissible and invalidated since there was no compelling state interest. But this line of reasoning seems to lead right
back to the Due Process Clause. The Court characterized Stanley's interest in his children as "cognizable and substantial. 49 Yet rather than
apply the equal protection test advanced in Weber, the Court said:
The State's interest in caring for Stanley's children is de minimis if
Stanley is shown to be a fit father. It insists on presuming rather
than proving Stanley's unfitness solely because it is more convenient. . . . Under the Due Process Clause that advantage is insufficient. .... 50
Perhaps the Court was reluctant to hold on equal protection grounds,
thereby rendering classifications of sex and marital status suspect in
the Stanley context, since these classifications would then be equally
suspect in other contexts. If the unwed father may assert parental
47. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).

48.

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205

(1888).
49. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).

50.

Id. at 657-58.

The Court also makes reference to other cases dealing with

the fundamental nature of family rights, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) and even to cases where the family is not legitimated by a marriage, e.g., Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968).
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rights after the unwed mother's death, an equal protection result might
well justify the unwed father's seeking parental rights immediately
after the child's birth. The immediate prospect of custody disputes
between mothers and fathers of illegitimate children could have made
the Court reluctant to take the easier path of a conventional, direct,
equal protection line of reasoning in Stanley. Yet, the dissent perceived
that there is a potential for custody disputes between unwed mothers
and fathers even under the species of due process reasoning used by the
Court. 51
Although the Court, in reality, decided Stanley on due process
grounds and only formally on equal protection grounds, its use of
equal protection at all raises a significant question. If Stanley is to
be accorded the benefit of a neglect proceeding as would any Illinois
parent, 52 then he must be considered a parent, at least for this purpose. The question then becomes whether he must be treated as a parent for other purposes. Under the present Illinois statute, only parents are entitled to a neglect hearing as to their fitness. By granting
Stanley such a hearing, the Court implicitly invalidated the classification Illinois has made. However, it did so on due process, rather than
equal protection grounds. As mentioned previously, if Stanley were
decided on equal protection grounds, as it may be interpreted, discriminatory treatment of unwed fathers must become questionable in other
contexts. However, if one reads the decision as based solely on due
process grounds, its application may be narrower.
Had the Court wished to use Stanley as a vehicle to announce broad
parental rights for unwed fathers, the Equal Protection Clause, under
the Weber formula, would have been an appropriate basis for decision.
This is especially so in view of the jurisdictional problems in Stanley
presented by the limited constitutional question argued in the courts
below. For the Court to struggle to fit this case into a due process
mold, it must have thought there would be a significant difference in
the consequences under a due process formula as opposed to an equal
protection formula.
Courts examining Stanley in the future should beware of applying
it in its equal protection sense. Where Stanley has been relied upon by
the Supreme Court, with some explanation for the rationale, procedural due process has been at issue. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 53 Stanley and
51.
52.
53.

405 U.S. 645, 661-62 n.1 (1972).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-4 (1971).
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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other cases were relied upon in order to invalidate Florida's and
Pennsylvania's replevin statutes as violative of due process. Stanley
was also cited in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth ' 4 in support
of the Court's comment that:
In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the
meaning of "liberty" [within the Due Process Clause] must be
broad indeed.55
In view of the potential consequences of an equal protection holding in
Stanley, it is easy to see why the Court has trod lightly in this respect.
CONSEQUENCES

The impact of Stanley could be felt on two levels. First, Mr. Chief
Justice Burger feared that the Court's method of analysis was merely to
use the Equal Protection Clause as a shorthand summary of all constitutional rights:
[A] State may not deny any constitutional right to some of its citizens without violating the Equal Protection Clause through its failure to deny such rights to all of its citizens. The limits on this
Court's jurisdiction are not
properly expandable by the use of such
56
semantic devices as that.
While the Court's method of analysis has its shortcomings, it seems unlikely that the Equal Protection Clause will be adopted as a "magic formula" for pleading constitutional issues. Mr. Justice Powell and Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, who did not participate in Stanley, would possibly
follow the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun in future cases
argued along these lines because of their strict constructionist tendencies
to date. At least one of the five remaining Justices might join these
four Justices should a broad "magic formula" approach be attempted.
The focus in Stanley is on the substantive issues presented. The
Court's opinion makes no note of any supposed jurisdictional innovation. Rather, it goes out of its way to indicate that:
[W] e dispose of the case on the constitutional premise raised below....
For the same reason the strictures of Cardinalev. Louisiana [holding that the Court cannot pass on a question not raised in the
courts below] . . . have been fully observed. 57
This language, while not persuasive for the proposition that Stanley is
an equal protection case, is a recognition of well settled jurisdictional
54.
55.
56.

57.

408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Id. at 572.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 660 (1972).

Id. at 658, n.10.
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concepts. Barring an immediate change in the Court's personnel, any
attempt to use the Equal Protection Clause as a simplified form of constitutional pleading probably would be rejected.
Beyond the jurisdictional question, there is a need to determine
whether the Stanley holding is to be broadly or narrowly applied. As
suggested, the initial statement of the opinion could be read in terms
of Stanley individually while the later statement of the holding was
phrased in terms of Stanley as an Illinois parent. The practical implication of this dichotomy is that under the first formulation, relief would
be granted in the future only to those similarly situated to Stanley. In
the narrowest sense, this class would include only those unwed fathers
who seek a hearing as to their parental fitness after the death of the
mother. On the other hand, the second statement of the holding mandates inclusion of Stanley and other unwed fathers in the category of
"parent," at least for a limited purpose. If this can be used as a vehicle
to declare unwed fathers parents for all purposes, they would be entitled to the full panoply of parental rights. According to Mr. Chief
Justice Burger, one of these rights might well be to seek and obtain
custody of the illegitimate child immediately after its birth.
The confusion in this area was compounded by two memorandum
opinions issued immediately following Stanley. In Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan,58 the Court vacated and remanded for further consideration
an Illinois Appellate Court decision 59 which denied custody of illegitimate children to the putative father even though the mother of the
children was at one time the putative father's wife. In the holding
of the Illinois court, it was stated that the father of illegitimate children had "no right to the society" of his children born out of wedlock. 6 0
In Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services of Wisconsin and Upper Michigan,6 the Court vacated and remanded a Wisconsin Supreme Court
decision 62 which held that a putative father had no right to deny consent to an adoption to which the unwed mother consents. In so
holding, the Wisconsin court also took the position that the putative
father had no parental rights. Furthermore, neither this, nor the
failure to give notice of a hearing prior to termination of parental rights
was held unconstitutional by the Wisconsin court. 65
58.

405 U.S. 1051 (1972).

59.
60.

126 Ill. App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1970).
Id. at 415, 262 N.E.2d at 720.

61. 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).

62. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services of Wisconsin and Upper Michigan,
47 Wis.2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970).

63.

186

Id. at 434, 179 N.W.2d at 63.
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One must be cautious in making inferences from cases summarily
vacated and remanded for further consideration. The Supreme Court
takes this action so that the state court will have an opportunity to
reconsider and clarify the basis on which it has ruled."1 Vanderlaan
is clearly opposed to any reading of Stanley in that the putative father
is held to have absolutely "no right to the society" in his children born
out of wedlock. This proposition cannot be sustained in light of Stanley. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the vacation of the
judgment mandates granting relief to the petitioner in Vanderlaan. If
Stanley is taken to hold only that the unwed father who seeks parental
rights when the mother has none is entitled to a hearing pertaining
to parental fitness, Vanderlaan would be distinguishable on its facts.
In Vanderlaan, the mother was alive as well as interested in keeping
custody of her illegitimate children. By the same reasoning, the Wisconsin decision vacated by Rothstein, holding that no notice is required
to terminate any existing parental rights in the unwed father, would be
contrary to Stanley even if it is read in the narrowest sense.
In light of this, it is most surprising to observe the action of the Illinois Supreme Court in the recent case of People ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home.65 Slawek was an appeal from an unsuccessful
habeas corpus proceeding instituted by the putative father of an ilegitimate child seeking to obtain custody from the adoptive parents of the
child. The petitioner's theory was that no adoption could be valid without the consent of the father, as well as the mother, even in cases of
unwed fathers. The Illinois Supreme Court read Stanley to hold distinctions between all other parents and unwed fathers as unreasonable and
therefore violative of equal protection.6 6 In light of this, the court
held unconstitutional certain provisions of the Illinois Adoption Act67
and the Illinois Paternity Act6 8 insofar as they were inconsistent with
Stanley. These provisions provided, respectively, that unwed mothers
have sole authority to consent to the adoption of an illegitimate child
and that putative fathers have absolutely no rights in their illegitimate
children. The Illinois court noted the language in Rothstein to the effect
that due consideration is to be given to the fact that the child in question had been living with the adoptive parents over a sustained period
of time.
64.
nesota
65.
66.
67.
68.

E.g., Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965); Minv. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
52 Ill.2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972).
Id. at 22, 284 N.E.2d at 292.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4 §§ 9.1-1, 9.1-8 (1971).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106% § 62 (1971).
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Although Slawek makes a questionable analysis of Stanley and its
progeny, it reaches a sound result. Slawek should be questioned since
nowhere in the majority opinion of Stanley is it held that the classification of "parent" made in the Juvenile Court Act is unreasonable. Only
in light of the denial of due process is there held to be a denial of equal
protection in Stanley. To reach its decision, the Stanley Court need only
have held that due process and thus equal protection were denied in
the specific facts of the case. This is not to say that due process would
or would not be a ground for relief to an unwed father in other instances. Such questions are for future resolution, not necessarily
having been decided by Stanley.
Secondly, the court in Slawek erred in making the inference from the
vacation of Vanderlaan and Rothstein that the Court disapproved of the
ultimate judgments in those cases. If an adequate ground for decision, not inconsistent with a permissible construction of Stanley, can be
found by Illinois or Wisconsin, it is possible for the Court to accept
the same result which occurred in the judgments it previously vacated.
However, after Stanley, the Court cannot accept a rationale for decision which holds that unwed fathers have absolutely no rights in their
illegitimate children. On the other hand, nothing in Stanley explicitly holds that the unwed father is entitled to the full panoply of
parental rights.
Although the grounds for the holding in Slawek may be questioned,
the approach taken there leads to the same result in the case of
adoption as does the narrow construction of Stanley propounded in
this comment. Slawek would require concurrent approval of both the
unwed mother and father prior to the release of an illegitimate child
for adoption. Even under a narrow reading of Stanley, the unwed
father would be entitled to this parental right when the mother terminates her rights in the child, as she does by consenting to an adoption.69 At that point, due process, as illustrated by Stanley would require the unwed father's consent to the adoption and, furthermore, due
process would be required before any such right could be taken
away.
In contrast to Slawek, a Washington appellate court took a more conservative course in In re Guardianship of Harp.70 In this case, the
putative father sought to be appointed guardian of the persons of his
illegitimate children who at the time were living in the custody of their
69.

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4 §§ 9.1-10, 9.1-11 (1971).

70.

6 Wash. App. 701, 495 P.2d 1059 (1972).

188

1973

Case Comments

mother. The court affirmed the denial of relief to the father, noting in
passing:
We shall not endeavor to unravel the complexities involved in giving notice to a putative father to permit him due process [in situations other than the one specifically presented in Stanley]. . . . We
commend that process to the legislature."
The position of the unwed father who seeks to play a parental role
has historically been equivocal. Illinois, prior to Slawek, even refused
to allow the unwed father visitation rights as to his illegitimate child."2
In light of Slawek, it is instructive to note the approach taken in other
jurisdictions prior to Stanley in situations where the putative father sought
custody on the mother's death or on her forfeiture of parental rights
in the illegitimate child. Such situations had arisen in at least three
jurisdictions (Michigan, California and Minnesota) prior to Stanley v.
Illinois.7" It is not surprising that each state found a different justification for granting the unwed father the relief sought.
Michigan adopted a course which achieved the least definitive result. 74 By invoking equitable jurisdiction, the court undertook to act
in a way thought to be in the best interests of the child. This is in
opposition to the common law treatment of illegitimates as filius populi.
The doctrine of filius populi, at common law, gave custody of an illegitimate child to the parish. Subsequently, it was modified to explicitly exclude the putative father from all consideration.7 5 Michigan discarded
strict application of this subsequent development in the concept of filius
populi and, in so doing, circumvented the state statute76 which allowed
the mother of an illegitimate child to irrevocably consent to its adoption
irrespective of the father's wishes. While such an approach may suffice
on an ad hoc basis, it settles nothing and does not delineate the substantive rights of the unwed father.
In contrast to Michigan's approach, California used a similar fact
situation as a vehicle to make a declaration of that state's policy as to
the rights of an unwed father toward his illegitimate child. In Guardianship of Smith, the court concluded that an unwed father should have
the right to custody of his children on the mother's death so long as he
71. Id. at -, 495 P.2d at 1062.
72. DePhillips v. DePhillips, 35 Ill.2d 154, 219 N.E.2d 465 (1966). Contra, People
ex rel. Francois v. Ivanova, 14 App. Div. 2d 317, 221 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1961).
73. For solutions developed in foreign countries, see Lasok, The Legal Status of
the Putative Father,17 INT. AND COMp. L.Q. 634 (1968).
74. In re T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 142, 154 N.W.2d 27, 37 (1967).
75. See generally, Note, Domestic Relations-Illegitimate Child-Visitation Rights
Granted to Putative Father, 26 ALBANY L.R. 335 (1962).
76. C.L.S. (1961) § 710.3.
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is found fit. 7 This result is reached by application of California's long
standing legislative policy in favor of legitimation.78 The court in Smith
would have been satisfied with the probability of the children's legitimation by acknowledgment on placement with their father. Justice
Traynor, in a concurring opinion, would have required affirmative action on the part of the father toward legitimating the child as a condition for granting custody. 7
Minnesota took a middle ground, stating that an unwed father seeking custody is in an unfavored position. However, it was held that he
could overcome the unfavorable presumptions against unwed fathers
by showing sufficient interest and concern for his child.8 ° In light of
Stanley v. Illinois, and the background provided by these three cases,
Illinois has two options should Slawek be limited. It can either await
judicial developments, such as the course taken in Michigan and
Minnesota, or it can enact a statutory solution as California did. In
either case, it is necessary that announced public policy be furthered,
if at all possible, within the framework of Stanley v. Illinois.
Even if the broader view of Stanley taken in Slawek is sustained,
there should be no great difficulty in dealing with custody disputes between parents following existing Illinois law. There is a statutory statement of the parental right to custody. 8 ' Assume, however, that an unwed mother and unwed father come to a custody proceeding with
equally earnest desire to obtain custody of an illegitimate child. There
is ample expression of judicial policy available which has been developed in the divorce field. Illinois has followed a policy of favoring
the mother in custody disputes in cases where the children are of
tender age.82 This would tend to mitigate the difficulties raised by
the partial abrogation of the rule that the unwed father has no rights at
all in his illegitimate child."' In addition, the court continues to have
jurisdiction in all custody proceedings after it makes its initial determination and may modify its custody decree in cases of materially changed
77. 42 Cal.2d 91, 93, 265 P.2d 888, 890, noted in 42 CALIF. L. REV. 514 (1954).
78. CAL. CIvIL CODE § 230 (West 1954): "The father of an illegitimate child, by
publicly acknowledging it as his own . . .with the consent of his wife, if he is married
• . .thereby adopts it. . . and. . . is thereupon deemed [legitimate]. . . . (enacted in

1872)."
79. 42 Cal.2d at 98, 265 P.2d at 893.
80. In re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 462-63, 134 N.W.2d 126, 131-32 (1965).
81. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 132 (1971). Legal custody carries with it full legal
responsibility in Illinois. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-12 (1971).
82. Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 416, 105 N.E.2d 300, 304 (1952).
83. DePhillips v. DePhillips, 35 I1.2d 154, 156, 219 N.E.2d 465, 466 (1966).
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circumstances.8 4 In Jenkins v. Jenkins,"5 one finds a statement of the
generally flexible policy followed by Illinois courts in custody disputes:
Generally, no decision a court makes in such cases can be considered either "right" or "wrong." The responsibility of a judge is, instead, to exercise his own best judgment in attempting to find
the most satisfactory solution under all the circumstances in each
case.86

Such a policy will continue to serve the courts as well or as poorly as
it has in the past. At least they will be able to use well settled, if internalized, criteria in an even-handed manner.
Adoption proceedings, however, are now in a state of limbo. Nothing is said in Slawek as to the standard of proof of paternity the putative father must present in order to gain standing. Furthermore, there
could be severe problems where the putative father is married to a
woman other than the unwed mother. Will the consent of the putative father's wife be necessary before he can seek custody of his illegitimate child? At what point may an adoptive parent feel secure in
the knowledge that his parental rights in the child are fixed? A consideration of these questions should have impelled the Illinois Supreme
Court to provide a more measured, less reflexive response to Stanley
than it provided in Slawek. By interpreting Stanley to require that the
unwed father cannot be treated differently from other parents, the Illinois court has implicitly adopted the view that the unwed mother and
the unwed father have equal rights in the illegitimate child. Thus,
Slawek opens the door to custody disputes which the Supreme Court in
Stanley would have preferred to avoid.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court planted a very strange hybrid when equal protection and due process were crossed in Stanley v. Illinois. In view of the
unfortunate constraint placed on the Court, it was forced to fashion a
formally equal protection solution from what was substantively a due
process problem. The confusion demonstrated by the court in Slawek
is a natural consequence.
A statutory scheme, such as that used in California,8 7 would have
provided Stanley with the relief he sought. It would have been in accord with Illinois public policy in that no rights are granted without the
84. Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 416, 105 N.E.2d 300, 304 (1952); Langin v. Langin,
2 111. App. 3d 544, 546, 276 N.E.2d 822, 824 (1971).
85. 81 111. App. 2d 67, 225 N.E.2d 698 (1967).
86. Id. at 71, 225 N.E.2d at 700.
87. Supra note 78.
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concurrent acceptance of legal responsibility. It does not depend on
any constitutionally impermissible classification.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger has grave forebodings that the "natural law
for unwed fathers . . . could well have strange boundaries as yet
undiscernible. ''8 8 The writer does not share the Chief Justice's concern.
Although the path to be eventually taken is as yet uncertain, the
Court's options have been defined. The Illinois court has taken its judicial choice in Slawek. Future interaction between the state legislatures, the state courts and the Supreme Court will define the "strange
boundaries" in due course.
DAVID

88.
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